Does free will exist?

Could you expand on that last line? The way I read it seems to support my case, but since you're arguing against it, it clearly shouldn't.
When I ask an application (say Excel) to make a calcualtion, I do not really care whether a) it is done, in machine code, by Excel; b) it is done, in machine code, by some O/S function; c) it is done by inbuilt routines by the CPU; d) it is done by a maths chip external to the CPU. I think - correctly, I believe - that the computer has done the calculation.

My decision-making functions are within me. It does not really matter where exactly a decision is made (which part or parts of the physical brain, whether the "software" that has performed it is considered to be part of my conscious mind or not).

What I'm suggesting is that we cannot say we lack free will simply because of where in our heads any particular decision is made. (Reflex actions are, of course, different as they invlove simple nerve paths outside the brain.) This is not a positive argument for free will, merely questioning one suggested argument against free will.
 
Actually, fascinating concept. Free Will as an evolutionary process, possibly culminating in the ultimate freedom: To create.

I like this concept.
 
If the legal system accepted free will did not exist, then both rehabilitation and deterrence are also non-starters. If it is my fate and/or my biology which makes me steal, then no amount of ordinary rehabilitation or deterrence will stop me or those whose fate/biology is similar to mine.

Not at all. I don't believe our biology solely influences our behaviour, but all our experiences since, and our current environment. Deterrence works by persuading some that the risk of committing a crime is too great. The ones it works against might be a particular group whose genes/experience/environment lead them to accept this argument, but it still works. And rehabilitation can also work, since it changes a person's experience, which is a major determinant of behaviour. It might not work on all criminals, but its effectiveness isn't limited by the absence of free will. The robot, if you like, gets reprogrammed throughout life, by everything that happens to it. Biology, as in one's genetic nature at birth, is only a small part of the matter.

When I ask an application (say Excel) to make a calcualtion, I do not really care whether a) it is done, in machine code, by Excel; b) it is done, in machine code, by some O/S function; c) it is done by inbuilt routines by the CPU; d) it is done by a maths chip external to the CPU. I think - correctly, I believe - that the computer has done the calculation.

My decision-making functions are within me. It does not really matter where exactly a decision is made (which part or parts of the physical brain, whether the "software" that has performed it is considered to be part of my conscious mind or not).

What I'm suggesting is that we cannot say we lack free will simply because of where in our heads any particular decision is made. (Reflex actions are, of course, different as they invlove simple nerve paths outside the brain.) This is not a positive argument for free will, merely questioning one suggested argument against free will.

It's also questioning the definition of free will, which I now realise I rashly took as read. Obviously your definition differs from mine above. How would you (or others) define it?
 
Sorry for double posting

This...

Freedom Evolves: Amazon.co.uk: Daniel C. Dennett: Books

... from a great writer, may interest you!

Thanks Stephen, looks very interesting. I'll definitely read it.

Maybe I should repeat, in case it got lost in my first post, that I'm not arguing that free will can't or doesn't exist, only that at this stage in human development, it is very rare. But I think it will develop, and the route to that development is an increased understanding of consciousness, so that we can become more -- and hopefully, in the end, almost fully -- aware of the powerful influence of our subconscious elements on our behaviour. (Though as Stormfeather pointed out, we can never be completely aware of all these billions of individual influences.)

A quote from a review of the book linked to above:

the free will debate has neither feature: we all think we are free to choose; as a brute fact either we are or we're not: but either way, we can't change it (if we're not free, then we aren't free to change to be free; if we are free, we're not free to decide not to be). Whatever the answer is, it can't make any difference to the way we live out our lives, since whether we're free to choose begs the very question we're asking.

I disagree with this for the reason above -- the capacity is there, however unexercised, and we can change it, with effort and with awareness of how we work.
 
** Parson may be able to hold simultaneously two contradictory ideas but I don't think that's the case for all his brethren


***
There once was a man who said 'Damn!
It is borne in upon me I am
An engine which moves
In predestinate grooves
I'm not even a bus, I'm a tram.'
(Maurice Evan Hare)

[Sigh!] Too true your Honor! But it should be much less true than it is for the Bible that we hold to be truth manages to take both sides of the question and declare them true. Why can't we who follow Jesus and the Bible do the same?



Freedom Evolves: Amazon.co.uk: Daniel C. Dennett: Books


Very interesting summary. I might add this book to my collection. So far as I see it he is arguing for evolutionary development of free will.
 
Not at all. I don't believe our biology solely influences our behaviour, but all our experiences since, and our current environment. Deterrence works by persuading some that the risk of committing a crime is too great.
Now I'm getting confused. If a person can make a decision based on past experiences, why is this not free will? I thought the whole point was that if you don't have free will, you don't make decisions as such, you simply do what biological imperatives require. Only if the experiences affect the chemical make-up of the brain can free will be lacking - which is the 'treatment' I was referring to as option (c).

Lack of free will to me means being made to do something by 'forces' outside one's control. If one can think, on no matter what level, 'If I steal this I'll be back in chokey again' and a decision is made not to steal, then that is free will in evidence I'd have thought.

If I'm understanding you aright, you think something can only be free will if the person knows each and every 'force' acting upon him/her -- including all the hidden forces of chemicals/neural pathways etc -- thinks about each force and how it is capable of 'requiring' one decision or another, and then he/she makes a considered decision not simply on the facts but taking into account all of those other factors and the influences they are bringing to bear. That to me seems far too convoluted. You might get a better decision that way (though how we define 'better' is likely to run into problems) but I can't see that a person who does that is exercising free will in a way that is alien to someone who makes a not-quite-snap judgement.
 
Now I'm getting confused. If a person can make a decision based on past experiences, why is this not free will? I thought the whole point was that if you don't have free will, you don't make decisions as such, you simply do what biological imperatives require. Only if the experiences affect the chemical make-up of the brain can free will be lacking - which is the 'treatment' I was referring to as option (c).

But past experiences affect the neural make-up of the brain, which is much the same thing. (Maybe.)

Lack of free will to me means being made to do something by 'forces' outside one's control. If one can think, on no matter what level, 'If I steal this I'll be back in chokey again' and a decision is made not to steal, then that is free will in evidence I'd have thought.

But if you have a genetic/chemical/neural propensity to say "I'll take the risk" or "I won't take the risk" is that not a force outside one's control? (I suppose that might depend how one defined "one")

If I'm understanding you aright, you think something can only be free will if the person knows each and every 'force' acting upon him/her -- including all the hidden forces of chemicals/neural pathways etc -- thinks about each force and how it is capable of 'requiring' one decision or another, and then he/she makes a considered decision not simply on the facts but taking into account all of those other factors and the influences they are bringing to bear. That to me seems far too convoluted. You might get a better decision that way (though how we define 'better' is likely to run into problems) but I can't see that a person who does that is exercising free will in a way that is alien to someone who makes a not-quite-snap judgement.

I'll redefine my argument to say that I believe conscious free will, in its true form, can only be exercised where the decision is not influenced by the subconscious. (And I suppose I might qualify that with "strongly influenced".) My contention is that at present, pretty much all activity is subconsciously driven, only to be consciously rationalised after the event. When you talk to someone, do you think out what you say before you speak it? Almost invariably not; you have a general idea of the point you want to make and the words are generated without forethought by previous linguistic programming.

And where does the initial idea come from? Anyone with any experience of meditation knows that thoughts arise in the mind on their own, without any "will" on the part of the individual. Same in the rest of our lives. Our subconscious minds are huge thought-generating machines that run on their own, and get us to run after them - and we think it's our conscious selves that are in control! Madness! Madness, I tells ya!!!!

OK, now I lie down.
 
A difference which makes no difference is no difference.

If, to he who experiences it, the illusion of free will can not be distinguished from the 'real thing', I submit that it truly doesn't matter.

There exist physical models of the universe (including must of those allowing time travel) where everything past present and future is fixed, predestination of the most rigid, invariant kind, and time is just an explanation for our dimension-limited senses. I don't particularly like them (or my particles wouldn't, if they had enough free will to like or dislike anything), but I can't disprove them.

On the other hand, with a slightly more flexible plenum, Heisenberg uncertainty guarantees us that any sufficiently large telephone exchange will give a certain irreducible percentage of wrong numbers. Could it be this Brownian fog of errors that makes us think we are thinking, deciding? Even if it is this, overlaying a lifetime's experience of previous mistakes that directs our choices, the sensation is that we call 'myself', which, if it is an illusion, is a very consistent and hard-wearing one.

To a metaphysician, consciousness might be a mess of genetic influences warring with experience, of random numbers that change with chemical stimuli, be they internally or externally applied interreacting with direct observations by the senses. But, in general, I 'like what I fancy I feel' and some of those aforementioned genetic factors suggest I stick to the illusion of 'feeling' a while yet.
 
A difference which makes no difference is no difference.

If, to he who experiences it, the illusion of free will can not be distinguished from the 'real thing', I submit that it truly doesn't matter.

But it does make a difference, and it can be distinguished. The process of distinguishing it is begun simply by asking "why did I do that?" or "why did I think that?" and not being satisfied with the default answer: "because I decided to". That is the argument advanced by the conscious ego, which presents itself as the one in control, which is what we like to believe. True conscious control can only come about after we identify the ways in which we are already controlled. But come about it can, eventually. Maybe not for a while, but consciousness hasn't stopped evolving yet.
 
I think the problem with the "everything is predetermined" argument is that it assumes that there is only one possible response to each set of circumstances with which an individual is faced.

I think that this is palpable nonsense as every choice we make is affected by previous choices we and others have made. The permutations flowing from each choice are so numerous and so complex that for the predetermination argument to work, we would each be having to make millions (if not trillions) of predetermined decisions each and every day, with every decison we make prompting further "trees" of predetermined reactions on the part of others. We would be reduced to something akin to a complex Scalextric car.

At a global or historical level, the choices humans have made have allowed us to develop and invent exciting things like penicillin, nuclear bombs, cars and tax returns. Many of our breakthrough discoveries were, apparently, discovered by accident, or were used for other purposes first. We have a great capacity to learn by doing and to learn from our mistakes. We can see further because we have stood on the shoulders of giants.

This is because our brains are wired in such a way that we do far, far more than just respond to a stimulus or react to a situation. We tend to be proactive rather than reactive. Our putative Scalextric car, by comparison, can do nothing until something happens to it - someone turns the power on, depresses the handset or throws it out of a window.

Predetermination also suggests that there is a force out there which sets the boundaries and which makes the choices for us. This is actually one of my big issues with religion, and although I have the very greatest of respect for Parson as an individual, I cannot see how anyone could be happy to accept such a massive and insoluble contradiction at the root of their faith.

To whit, free will and predetermination can only exist side by side if we accept that god has, for some reason best known to himself, given some the non-beleivers just enough rope to hang ourselves with. He becomes the celestial Scalextric controller, deciding that he will cause certain cars to go into that tight hairpin at full tilt, meaing that they will inevitably leave the track and never cross the finish line to join the winners on the pearly rostrum. So, in other words, he punishes them for doing what he caused them to do in the first place. He forces them to take responsibility for his actions and to live with the consequences which he has also determined. If that doesn't completely undermine the notion of a loving or caring god, I really don't know what does.

But if there is no force out there, there is nothing to predetermine what we do. The "rules" governing our world which we have identified may have been identified wrongly or understood incorrectly or may not exist at all. Therefore we must be exercising free will. We must be shaping our world rather than the other way around.

Given the pigs ear we generally make of it, the evidence would seem to support this latter proposition.

Regards,

Peter
 
I'm not sure predeterminists would balk at the numbers involved. The notion that all actions have a single origin is all that it takes. Human action is in this way no different from subatomic action. Billions+ of minute processes have led to a single destination in spacetime, from the infinitesimal to the infinite.

But now we're at the infinitely small, Free Will espousers may take huge comfort from the Heisenberg Principle. Of course, predeterminists will argue that they are currently inhabiting the only Universe that their "random" course could allow.

I believe both arguments to be incredibly strong and that it is only our emotional attachment to freedom of will that deters the larger number of people from acknowledging the alternative. After all, the alternative would make us all automatons with no say in how we act or feel or respond to others.

And that just wouldn't feel right.
 
Predetermination also suggests that there is a force out there which sets the boundaries and which makes the choices for us. This is actually one of my big issues with religion, and although I have the very greatest of respect for Parson as an individual, I cannot see how anyone could be happy to accept such a massive and insoluble contradiction at the root of their faith.

To whit, free will and predetermination can only exist side by side if we accept that god has, for some reason best known to himself, given some the non-beleivers just enough rope to hang ourselves with. He becomes the celestial Scalextric controller, deciding that he will cause certain cars to go into that tight hairpin at full tilt, meaing that they will inevitably leave the track and never cross the finish line to join the winners on the pearly rostrum. So, in other words, he punishes them for doing what he caused them to do in the first place. He forces them to take responsibility for his actions and to live with the consequences which he has also determined. If that doesn't completely undermine the notion of a loving or caring god, I really don't know what does.

Thank you for your kind words.

The problem is not quite "insoluble." But it does take a belief in an omniscient God. I would refer you to Romans 8:29 "For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his son..." My understanding of this verse is that predestination comes after knowledge, so God in his omniscience knew the choices I was going to make before the beginning of time and space. Leaving me both free to choose and having been already chosen.

Thanks as well for the great Scrabble word. Scalextric sent me to my dictionary post haste. :)
 
I have always had trouble aligning God with free will, if there is a God and he is outside of time and can therefore see all that will ever happen then how can I have any free will if all my decisions have already been made (and foreseen)
Also if the multiverse theory is correct, then I don't make one decision, because every time a choice is made all choices are made and the universe splits to allow each of these choices. While the multiverse scenario does allow for God to foresee all possible universes it still doesn't allow me to have any free will, admittedly this universe is the one where I decided to join in this discussion, in others I only sat and watched, but is that a free choice and as we all agree that this is the only universe we can see what is the point in postulating about the others?

there must be some very simple thought exercise that allows us to confirm (or deny) the existence of free will, trouble is I can't think of it! ;)

I'm not sure why but I have just thought about sword fighting, in the film I recently watched (Zatoichi) two swordsmen face each other, the Samurai closes his eyes and sees the fight in his mind's eye predicting what will happen and how he can counter the other's moves to win. In the moment when he realises how to win, he is happy and makes a noise. This then inspires the other (a blind man) to change his drawing method (and angle) causing the Samurai to lose the fight. Obviously this is an example of cause and effect, there maybe no free will involved, but the use of 'mind's eye' fighting suggests that there isn't any free will to change the outcome of the fight before it has begun. Not sure if that has any relevance though. :(
 
I have always had trouble aligning God with free will, if there is a God and he is outside of time and can therefore see all that will ever happen then how can I have any free will if all my decisions have already been made (and foreseen)

I am sure that Parson will correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that the religious argument would run:-

God allows us to exercise the free will he has given us. However, he knows how we are going to exercise it before we do. But he doesn't stop us exercising our free will, even if we mess it up.

This is a tidy argument, but for me it is wholly unconvincing. It smacks of squaring the circle. What it doesn't address is the central question, which is why does an apparently loving God set us up to fail in the first place? If he created us, he is responsible for giving us free will. Why did he do that in such a way that ensures that lots of us could mess it up and then suffer the consequences, which he also determines?

Regards,

Peter


PS: Glad you like the word, Parson. Scalextric was what the groovy boys wanted instead of (or sometimes as well as) a Hornby railway.
 
I doubt "Scalextric" it would be much use in Scabble, though. Or does that game allow proper nouns to be freely used?
 
I am sure that Parson will correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that the religious argument would run:-

God allows us to exercise the free will he has given us. However, he knows how we are going to exercise it before we do. But he doesn't stop us exercising our free will, even if we mess it up.

This is exactly the way the argument runs.

This is a tidy argument, but for me it is wholly unconvincing. It smacks of squaring the circle. What it doesn't address is the central question, which is why does an apparently loving God set us up to fail in the first place? If he created us, he is responsible for giving us free will. Why did he do that in such a way that ensures that lots of us could mess it up and then suffer the consequences, which he also determines?

Regards,

Peter


PS: Glad you like the word, Parson. Scalextric was what the groovy boys wanted instead of (or sometimes as well as) a Hornby railway.
Ah, now you've asked the question that none can answer outside of God. Why should he make us this way? No one knows, the logical answer is that a love that is ingrained, outside of free will in this discussion, is not love at all. Love requires a choice, or so the argument goes. To extend what I said early in this thread "What is logical is not always true."

In any system built of faith, in truth any system whatever, there comes a point sooner or later that you have to say I don't know the answer to that.


Ursa:

I doubt "Scalextric" it would be much use in Scabble, though. Or does that game allow proper nouns to be freely used?
Proper nouns are not permitted in tournament Scrabble, or Scrabble played according to the accepted rules, but exceptions can be made to the accepted if all are accepting of the exception. :D

Mosaix
Would Scabble be much use in Scrabble though? ;)
This must be a dictionary day for me. But after looking up my second word of the day, yes scabble would be of use. If you could lay it first it would be a "Bingo" (a play in which all seven tiles in your possession are played at once) giving a bonus score of 50 beyond the board score.
 
Would Scabble be much use in Scrabble though? ;)
:eek:

Aaaarrrr, it would, Jim, lad.


(To scabble is 1. to rough-dress (stone); 2. to cabble**. :))




** - Which is to break up flat pieces of partially finished iron for fagotting. (Would Irn Bru be the right drink to go with those faggots? :rolleyes:)
 

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