Anything like Altered Carbon's sleeves?

[Fishbowl Helmet]

If you don't know it or haven't read it, Altered Carbon by Richard Morgan is a great read, I think. What I'm looking for are more stories, novels or shorts, or whatever, that use anything similar to his 'sleeves' idea. The basics are human bodies have a stack (re: computer storage) implanted to backup the person's mind. The mind can be transferred between bodies (re: sleeves) with ease. A large part of the novel deals with the interesting and cool implications of such technology.

I'm looking for other books that use the same or similar devices. And yes, I am aware he has written sequels. Thanks in advance.

 

[HareBrain]

I haven't read the book yet, but I'm interested in this concept, especially in how it relates to awareness. Does he explain how awareness is transferred? (I assume it is, otherwise there wouldn't be much point to the individual.) Can the same mind be transferred into two new bodies? If not, why not, and if it can, how does he deal with the problem of duplicate or shared awareness?

 

[Fishbowl Helmet]

I haven't read the book yet, but I'm interested in this concept, especially in how it relates to awareness. Does he explain how awareness is transferred? (I assume it is, otherwise there wouldn't be much point to the individual.) Can the same mind be transferred into two new bodies? If not, why not, and if it can, how does he deal with the problem of duplicate or shared awareness?

I'm not sure what you mean by awareness here, but yes, he deals with duplication and multiple copies of a single mind. Each copy is a unique mind that has individual experiences and essentially would develop into a unique person over time. Which is why it's illegal, but it does happen several times in the book.

 

[HareBrain]

I just mean the sense of self: what makes the difference between transferring "me" to another body, and merely ending up with a different body with an identical mind. If this sense of self is transferrable, then it should be duplicatable, and you'd get a collective "self", with a single awareness but multiple bodies. Is that what happens?

 

[alchemist]

Peter F Hamilton has similar concepts, such as people's consciousness being backed up. In the Void trilogy, one character is a "multiple" i.e. one mind, a number of bodies, all experiences shared. He takes it to some, er, adult places.

 

[Ursa major]

I just mean the sense of self: what makes the difference between transferring "me" to another body, and merely ending up with a different body with an identical mind. If this sense of self is transferrable, then it should be duplicatable, and you'd get a collective "self", with a single awareness but multiple bodies. Is that what happens?

Morgan also deals with this. I won't say more, because the various issues around sleeves and stored self - and self itself )) - form a major part of the book and I don't want to spoilt it for you or others. (Which would be a shame, because Altered Carbon really is an excellent read.)

 

[Fishbowl Helmet]

** SPOILERS **

I just mean the sense of self: what makes the difference between transferring "me" to another body, and merely ending up with a different body with an identical mind. If this sense of self is transferrable, then it should be duplicatable, and you'd get a collective "self", with a single awareness but multiple bodies. Is that what happens?

The 'me' is simply your mind. Your collective experiences make yours unique from mine. If your mind is copied each thinks of itself as the 'original' because they are literally identical. They each experience what the body they individually inhabit experiences. There is no third location sharing the experiences and collected memories of individual bodies that house copies of the original mind.

It's software. My copy of word has no impact on yours, and neither of our copies has an impact on the source code. Or like math. Your mind is the variable x. I copy x twice, yielding x sub 1, x sub 2, x sub 3. Each moves to a different city and lives their own lives. X sub 1 doesn't experience anything that sub 2 or 3 does. Each accumulates a year or more worth of experience completely unique from the others. Each thinks of itself at the self, because from their perspective, they are.

While some characters question the spiritual side of this (part of the plot actually), the author handles this as purely materialistic. There is no self separate from the mind. They are one and the same.

 

[HareBrain]

Morgan also deals with this. I won't say more, because the various issues around sleeves and stored self - and self itself )) - form a major part of the book and I don't want to spoilt it for you or others. (Which would be a shame, because Altered Carbon really is an excellent read.)

OK, I'll probe no further (or not much further). It does sound an intersting read.

The 'me' is simply your mind. Your collective experiences make yours unique from mine. If your mind is copied each thinks of itself as the 'original' because they are literally identical. They each experience what the body they individually inhabit experiences. There is no third location sharing the experiences and collected memories of individual bodies that house copies of a single mind.

While some characters question the spiritual side of this (part of the plot actually), the author handles this as purely materialistic. There is no self separate from the mind. They are one and the same.

Sure, but if each copy of the mind has its own awareness, then even in materialistic terms this is not a continuation of the same individual or the same "ego", as far as the original individual is concerned. If I die and my awareness switches off, it doesn't restart when my backed-up mind is switched on -- that would give rise to a separate awareness with the same memories and attributes as my current one. But "I" wouldn't inhabit it.

I just wondered really if this system were being treated as a kind of immortality, because it seems to have been in other stories**. I'm glad that from your comments Morgan seems to have a more intelligent take on it. I'll add it to my list.

** but not any I can actually remember, so I can't help with your question, sorry!

 

[Fishbowl Helmet]

** SPOILERS **

Sure, but if each copy of the mind has its own awareness, then even in materialistic terms this is not a continuation of the same individual or the same "ego", as far as the original individual is concerned. If I die and my awareness switches off, it doesn't restart when my backed-up mind is switched on -- that would give rise to a separate awareness with the same memories and attributes as my current one. But "I" wouldn't inhabit it.

The ego, the individual, the I, the me, and the mind are identical in materialistic terms. There is no difference between a mind ending in one body, and an identical mind beginning in another body. Each would have a sense of self. There is no ego separate from experience, or separate from the mind. The copied mind would think, act, react, respond, and behave as if it was the person. There's nothing beyond that, nor separate from that.

And this is actually used in a really interesting scene in the book. Two copies of a mind with slightly different experiences have to chat about which one should survive. I can't say more without blowing a great scene.

 

[Ursa major]

As I mentioned in my earlier post, going into this in too much detail is likely to lead to spoilers. If you do wish to go into such detail, please place a spoiler alert in your posts.

Thank you.

 

[HareBrain]

There is no difference between a mind ending in one body, and an identical mind beginning in another body.

From the perspective of the copy, correct -- the copy would perceive himself to be a continuation of the original. But what happens from the original's perspective? If the original's perception is transferred to the copy, what happens if two copies are activated? Or if a copy is activated while the original is still alive?

Either you would have shared awareness in such a case, a "group mind", or awareness/perception is not transferrable. But if it isn't transferrable, then from the perspective of the original, he dies, even if his copies believe him to live on in themselves.

I don't want to know Morgan's answers to this if it's going to spoil anything, but I would be interested to know if he has taken it into account.

Each would have a sense of self. There is no ego separate from experience, or separate from the mind. The copied mind would think, act, react, respond, and behave as if it was the person. There's nothing beyond that, nor separate from that.

No argument with any of that, but as I hope I've made clear above, that wasn't my point.

 

[Connavar]

Morgan deals well with his answers to your question about having your mind copied like that. The more creepy,fascinating part is the idea of being put in a shelf in a memory disc.

The human mind is much more important than the body. The body cant live without the mind,the brain and all your thoughts is what you are and if you dont bring religious stuff in.

I wont spoil but Morgan deals with copies of your mind in his own way. The clash of different bodies and the same mind,awareness is a big part of the book. Why i miss the series, it was science wise horrific future when we can deal with our awareness like that.

 

[Vertigo]

As everyone says, it's tooi easy to get into spoilers here. But not too spoilerish to mention that I enjoyed the way you might get unlucky and get a sleeve that already has a physical addiction to something like tobacco!

As for similar ideas in other books. There was one I read sometime ago but can't remember author or title. However in this book I think space travel was a problem because they had no FTL, but some people could "travel" telepathically and other people hired their bodies out for those travellers to use. I'm a bit vague about the rest of it. I think there were some alien animals that had wheels instead of legs, but I wouldn't swear to it.

 

[Rodders]

Iain M. Banks' Look to Windward had something similar in the form of the Chel Substrates. (These would be downloaded into the Chel Heaven that was created by that races "Sublimed".)

 

[Fishbowl Helmet]

From the perspective of the copy, correct -- the copy would perceive himself to be a continuation of the original. But what happens from the original's perspective?

If the 'original' is aware of the copying, they know a copy was made.

Either you would have shared awareness in such a case, a "group mind", or awareness/perception is not transferrable. But if it isn't transferrable, then from the perspective of the original, he dies, even if his copies believe him to live on in themselves.

The minds, once copied are not connected in any fashion, except for identical experiences prior to that moment. If two copies of a mind are active simultaneously they simply exist. There is no transference of data while both are active, unless they talk to each other. There's no psychic link, no telepathy, hivemind or anything like that.

The standard operating procedure when 'moving' a mind from one body to another is to put the body under anesthesia, copy the mind off the stack (physical body storage), write it to a disc, and wipe the stack. The 'original' mind doesn't perceive its death, and the 'copy' remembers going to sleep.

You seem to be operating under the assumption that 'awareness'--or 'perception' as you're now calling it--exists separate from the mind. That is not the case. These are simply functions of the mind.

 

[HareBrain]

You seem to be operating under the assumption that 'awareness'--or 'perception' as you're now calling it--exists separate from the mind.

I'm not. My question is only concerned with what happens from the point of view of the original (ie whether or not "immortality" is achieved) but you haven't addressed that, except here:

The 'original' mind doesn't perceive its death

So, you accept that the original does die, i.e. his perception ceases forever? Or did you mean "death" as in a temporary shutdown?

I'm not saying that awareness is separate from the mind, I'm suggesting that there is no continuity of perception from the point of view of the original when his mind is installed in a new body, only from the point of view of the copy. That surely has to be the case, otherwise what would happen if the copy was activated whilst the original was still alive? And if you accept that in that case the original's perception remains only with his original mind, how would that perception then be transferred if his body was dead?

As far as the original is concerned, when he goes to sleep for his mind to be transferred, that's it -- he does not wake up. The copy is created with the perception that he is the awakened individual, but that is not the same thing.

 

[Fishbowl Helmet]

I'm not. My question is only concerned with what happens from the point of view of the original (ie whether or not "immortality" is achieved) but you haven't addressed that, except here:

Yes, immortality is achieved, because from the perspective of the mind, it doesn't stop functioning. It continues for decades, centuries in some cases, accumulating vast experience.

So, you accept that the original does die, i.e. his perception ceases forever? Or did you mean "death" as in a temporary shutdown?

From the perspective of the mind, it's no different than waking up from an operation.

I'm not saying that awareness is separate from the mind, I'm suggesting that there is no continuity of perception from the point of view of the original when his mind is installed in a new body, only from the point of view of the copy.

From the point of view of the mind, it is the original, even the copies think they're the original, until proven wrong. There is no unique 'original' point of view that's lost when one copy is made and one is destroyed. Both have the same data, and operate as if they were the 'original', because they are identical, and by any definition the same. The 'copy' perceives things the exact same way the 'original' would.

As far as the original is concerned, when he goes to sleep for his mind to be transferred, that's it -- he does not wake up. The copy is created with the perception that he is the awakened individual, but that is not the same thing.

There is no 'he' separate from the mind. In a materialistic universe, they are the same thing. And in the context of the story, they are the same thing. If you put the 'original' and the 'copy' side by side there would be absolutely no way to distinguish between them. This is why I keep saying you're thinking of 'perception' or 'awareness' as something separate than the mind. That's really what the argument is. You're asking, using different words, "What about the soul?" No such thing. All that we are is biology and chemistry. Electrical pulses firing through a lump of grey matter housed in a skull. Make an exact copy of that, and you have some really interesting questions to play with, but "What about the soul?" isn't one of them.

 

[HareBrain]

OK, I'd be interested to see what you make of this:

Let’s say my mind is copied while I'm alive, and loaded into you while I'm in the room. There are now two people "running" my mind, yes? Now you leave the room. Where do I perceive myself to be, in the room or outside? In the room, of course – my awareness/perception does not transfer to your body or mind. Now let’s say I'm killed in the room. Does my awareness transfer to you then? Nope, it dies. I have no more thought, no sensory input, no experience -- nothing. You do, and as far as you are concerned, you are me; but from my perspective, my "stream of consciousness" is over for good.


Assuming you don't contest any of that, why is that scenario any different from what would happen if I died and my mind was then awakened in your brain? I contend that it isn’t. The stream of consciousness of the original ends, and if he has bought into this download as a way of cheating death, then he's bought a dud.

 

[Fishbowl Helmet]

OK, I'd be interested to see what you make of this:

Let’s say my mind is copied while I'm alive, and loaded into you while I'm in the room. There are now two people "running" my mind, yes? Now you leave the room. Where do I perceive myself to be, in the room or outside? In the room, of course – my awareness/perception does not transfer to your body or mind. Now let’s say I'm killed in the room. Does my awareness transfer to you then? Nope, it dies. I have no more thought, no sensory input, no experience -- nothing. You do, and as far as you are concerned, you are me; but from my perspective, my "stream of consciousness" is over for good.

Assuming you don't contest any of that, why is that scenario any different from what would happen if I died and my mind was then awakened in your brain? I contend that it isn’t. The stream of consciousness of the original ends, and if he has bought into this download as a way of cheating death, then he's bought a dud.

Again, you're adding things in there that don't exist. 2+2=4, not 5.

Two physical bodies (hardware), each with an identical copy of the same mind (software). They are separate and distinct. 'You' perceive with your physical eyes, while filtering events through 'your' thoughts and experience. 'I' perceive with my physical eyes, while filtering events through 'my' thoughts and experience. Anything you experience after the copying is unique to you, likewise, anything I experience after the copying is unique to me.

Wondering about "where you perceive from" or any of that is like asking if you install Word on your PC will it appear on my PC. They might ship from the factory as nearly identical copies of the same thing, but that doesn't imply a connection of any kind.

The trouble is the terms. We don't really have terms for what we're talking about. "You" and "me" as commonly used not only imply physical distinctiveness, but experiential and mental distinctiveness. In this case we're taking the physical differences out of the equation, leaving only the mind.

If our minds are identical (contain all the same information, experiences, thoughts, feelings, emotions, etc) then they are the same mind. However, we are located in two separate places, and experience things from different angles, in a literal sense. You sit over there, while I sit over here. But we would filter our perceptions through two instances of the same lens, as we have two copies of the same experiences. Nothing you experience has any effect on my experiences, nor do mine effect yours.

Now, any experiences gained since the copying are lost if that instance of the mind is destroyed. But 'you' don't die, as 'I' am a nearly identical copy with all the same life experiences up to the copying. That which is the person, the personality, the experiences the thoughts, feelings, and emotions continue on as they're all simply a function of the mind. The only things unique to you are those few memories formed since the copying.

That sense of self, sense of self-awareness, that 'me-ness' you seem to be groping for is simply a function of the mind. We would both feel the same way. We would both say "I am Fishbowl Helmet," and we'd both be right. Any quantifiable measure of personality would exist beyond the 'death' of one instance of the mind. But, an identical mind--or nearly identical mind--would continue to exist.

 

[Hex]

Skinned by Robin Wasserman is a YA book that covers these kind of questions. If your stored consciousness is reborn in another body, is that new identity 'you'? (except the book is brilliant and clever and very easy to read!)