The Age Of The Battlecruiser

There's a difference between sticking a big gun in a cargo aircraft that's facing a few guerillas with AK47s and RPGs who are a minimal threat, and sending a big, expensive, lightly-armoured ship to fight battleships that can destroy it with one hit. One is sensible, the other is, if I can use a technical term... stupid.

I disagree with you on that. To a degree, it was a reasonable tactic. If you sent out the big guns, Battleships/Dreadnaughts, screening elements also go along. ie: Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates. The tactic is still used today with the Aircraft Carrier fleets. The British Navy believed, somewhat wrongly, that the German fleet would have the same problems with long range plunging fire accuracy as they did. The stupidity is that they did not learn their lesson in WW1 as so repeated it in WW2 resulting in the loss of HMS Hood.
 
From the accounts I've read of actions in both wars, it's the destroyer (closely followed by the cruiser) that comes out with most credit. There were some heroic efforts where the smaller ships took on much larger opponents...example.. Glowworm versus the Admiral Hipper HMS Glowworm (H92) - Wikipedia

They truly were the attack dogs of the sea.
 
From the accounts I've read of actions in both wars, it's the destroyer (closely followed by the cruiser) that comes out with most credit. There were some heroic efforts where the smaller ships took on much larger opponents...example.. Glowworm versus the Admiral Hipper HMS Glowworm (H92) - Wikipedia

They truly were the attack dogs of the sea.

What about PT Boats?
 
What about PT Boats?

I certainly don't mean any disrespect to the crews of these craft but to be honest, I don't know much about them. I think the British equivalent would be the Vosper MTB.
Vosper 73 ft motor torpedo boat - Wikipedia

I do know two things...1) that the future President John F. Kennedy was a PT boat captain
2) that small motor gun boats played a major and absolutely vital role in the greatest Commando raid in history (the raid on St. Nazaire) so kudos to the crews of all MTBs, PT Boats and E Boats (the German torpedo boats)
 
talking of Hood era alternate history - I do wonder what would have happened had the Germans not lost:

Bismark
Graf Spee

and had used the Tirpitz properly too.

2 major ships and one reasonably large one would not have changed the course of the war, I do wonder the inpact they would have had?

I don't see what the survival of the said ships would have done to change anything. They were really just white elephants - as soon as they were on the open see, the RN would have hunted them down, so the only impact they could have had was, as Foxbat states was a threat to convoys - particularly the Russian ones that had to go past Norway. I believe faulty intelligence did cause the RN to order PQ 17 to scatter, believing that Tirpitz was on course and almost 2/3rds of the convoy was sunk because of this.

No, what they should have done instead of building these capital ships (They also built the hull of an aircraft carrier - the Graf Zeppelin - but never completed her) was to focus on U-boats. Luckily for us they only had 46 operational submarines at the start of the war and it took them a long time to really shift naval production to them. They were highly effective at the start of the war, if there had been a significant number more they could have starved the UK out.
 
The value of the Bismark, Tirpitz and the Graf Spee would have been to divert our own heavy fleet units into convoy defence duties, rather than their war fighting power in of themselves. (as impressive as they were - the Kreigs Marine had far fewer heavy units and there was no opportunity for the huge Pacific theatre battles).

In particular for Operation Rhienburg, the mission of Bismark and Prinz Eugens was never to engage enemies of equal strength:

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder's orders to Admiral Günther Lütjens were that "the objective of the Bismarck is not to defeat enemies of equal strength, but to tie them down in a delaying action, while preserving her combat capacity as much as possible, so as to allow Prinz Eugen to get at the merchant ships in the convoy" and "The primary target in this operation is the enemy's merchant shipping; enemy warships will be engaged only when that objective makes it necessary and it can be done without excessive risk."

This is one of the reasons why, following the destruction of the Hood (a battlecruiser), Lutjens never pressed the attack against the Prince of Wales (POW - A battleship). They probably were not aware of the issues the POW was suffering from, (malfunctioning turrets) and even if they did, the initial engagement had used up around a third of their ammunition stores. POW, even wounded and with malfunctioning turrets, would have been a much tougher nut to crack than the Hood in terms of actually sinking her.

This is somewhat evidenced by how tough Bismark herself was to sink -

The four British ships fired more than 2,800 shells at Bismarck, and scored more than 400 hits, but were unable to sink Bismarck by gunfire.


Bismark might have eventually won against the POW, in fact probably would have, but it would have been a pyrhic victory (in actual fact, history proved that to be the case anyway, but there was no way they could know that at this point). Their mission would be over. They would have likely sustained further damage. Their ammunition stores would have been depleted. And strategically, they would have accomplished very little - after all, we vastly outnumbered the Kreigs Marine in terms of heavy fleet units - in other words, we had plenty more BBs, and Bismark would never have taken them all out. It was more important for them to preserve the Bismark and Prinz Eugens, both in terms of mission objectives and the units themselves.

Now back to the original post's point.

In many ways, the roles of Bismark and the Hood was reversed in intention.

Rheinburg intended Bismark to be used as a Battlecruiser, as per Fisher's original vision:

"Heavy enough guns to destroy anything smaller, fast enough to run away from anything bigger."

Hood and POW
were being used as Battleships (admttedly - that was less planned, and more a response), to deny the theatre to Bismark (forcing her to run) or simply take her out.

Both Bismark and Hood failed in their missions. They were the wrong tools for their mission briefs. (POW did, kind of, succeed in driving Bismark away)

Had Bismark been a faster BC, she might have avoided engaging Hood and POW. And evaded the subsequent hunt and been able to perform her mission. Had Hood been a BB, or had received her upgrades, she would have been far more effective in denying the theatre, perhaps forcing Bismark out of the area completely, or kept her moving, and unable to effectively strike, until she ran out of fuel and had to leave.

But yes, there is a certain romance to the BC, which was never afforded the opportunity to actually happen in the real world. A fast and powerful predator. She chooses her fights, and wins. Those she can't win, she's not interested in fighting.
 
Hey @Foxbat I don't think you've mentioned that, at least for WW1, I believe that Beatties Battlecruiser squadron was stationed just doon the water from you at Rosyth.

Cue picture of the HMS Hood next to the Forth Rail Bridge :)
Hood.jpg
 
HMS Invincible (1907-1916)

The very first of Jackie Fisher's battlecruisers, fought with distinction in the Battle of the Falkland Islands (1914)

02_invincible.jpg


Hit by plunging fire from either Lützow or Derfflinger at Jutland. The central magazine has been hit, and the explosion touched off the forward one as well - note the plume of flame from the fore-turret...

HMS-Invincibles-centre-magazines-explode-IMW-SP2468-526x384.jpg


Minutes later. The stern and bow aren't floating - the North Sea there is so shallow, the broken ends are actually resting on the sea-bed.

HMS-Invincible-sinks-IWM-SP2470-580x325.jpg


1,032 officers and crew. 6 survivors. "Eggshells armed with sledgehammers"
 
Saw an interesting piece on the battle of Jutland on BBC4. It has some relevance to this thread because they carried out a couple of experiments.

The first was a comparism between HMS Queen Mary (which sank after only seven hits) and SMS Seydlitz - a comparable german battlecruiser that survived twenty one hits and managed to limp home. They built a scale model of the Queen Mary hull with all the watertight compartments. Then they simulated flooding caused by hits - except they used the 21 hits from the Seydlitz instead of the 7 hits QM actually took. The hull managed to stay afloat (just). They concluded that it was not an engineering or design flaw that sunk the HMS QM.

Next, they did an experiment with cordite and built a model representing a turret and shaft leading to the magazine. It was known that to save time, bags of cordite were stashed in the turret and all doors wedged open (against safety protocols). A ship like the QM carried around 1000 15 inch shells and each shell needed 4 bags of cordite for propellant, so that's 4000 bags of cordite.

They filled both turret and magazine with the amounts representative by the scale and ignited the cordite in the turret to simulate a shell hit. The results were spectacular. Slow motion showed a flame rapidly moving downwards and into the magazine, which, when ignited, literally blew the model apart - blasting welds and rivets with the pressure. What the model did not have was the high explosive equivalent of the fifteen inch shells themselves. Add those to the mix and the results would be horrific.

Allied to the fact that all eyewitness accounts mentioned a tower of flame, it left me in no doubt that the suspected bad practices of leaving doors open (under pressure from the commanding officers to fire as rapidly as possible) between turret and magazines were indeed the reasons for such catastrophic sinkings.
 
Just finished another book on the subject (British Battlecruisers 1914-1918 by Lawrence Burr). I think the author makes some interesting points. One is that the Battleship was reaching an evolutionary dead end and that the battlecruiser is the true descendant of modern warships. The battlecruiser concept had, at its heart, the notion of replacing a large number of short duration battleships scattered at coaling stations throughout the empire. The battlecruiser with its greater range and speed would mean that less ships were needed to give a global reach. They relied on speed, agility and hitting power rather than armour. When you look at today's ships, you can see how they have rid themselves of armour and rely on speed, agility and defensive countermeasures to defend themselves. The effects of what goes wrong when all defences fail and a lightly armoured ship is struck by a powerful weapon became all too clear in the Falklands Conflict.

But, like the battlecruiser, modern ships maintain great hitting power and provide global reach. Indeed, it has been said (although I am not qualified to know one way or the other) that a single Type 45 Destroyer could deal with the entire Argentine navy should there ever be another conflict.

Another point he makes about Fisher's reasoning behind the design was the fear he had of the great strides being made in torpedo development. It's not hard to see how a line of very large battleships would make easy targets for a spread of torpedoes. Ironic, that the battlecruiser was used as a ship of the line when it was designed to move away from that concept to one of smaller, faster, hard hitting squadrons. Again, this can be seen in the initial battlecruiser designs with two of its four turrets amidships. This was done in order that six large guns could be trained forward rather than as a traditional broadside. The thinking behind it was that the battlecruiser would be chasing down its prey rather than taking its place in a line.

Finally, a thought for the ship designers. It's easy to see how difficult their task must have been when you look at the rapid development of naval technology.

1860 first ocean-going ironclad
1862 revolving gun turret
1866 first torpedo trial
1868 submerged torpedo tube
1870 hydraulic power
1874 electric power
1876 armour plating
1879 breech loading guns
1881 electric range trasmitter
1883 rapid fire guns
1884 turbine engines
1885 armour piercing shells
1886 high pressure boilers
1888 nitro glycerine & cellulose based propellants and high explosives
1890 director firing and stereoscopic rangefinders
1891 telescopic gun sight andautomatic plot for fire control
 
FB said:
...and that the battlecruiser is the true descendant of modern warships

I'd agree with your argument, especially if you meant to say 'ancestor...' :unsure:
 
... Fascinating battle, Jutland, a textbook example of Murphy's Law in action...

And Murphy, I believe, was indeed a First Engineer, whose famous 'If anything can go wrong, it will' was coined in the engine room of a ship at war?

Great thread. Fascinating ...
 
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Something else worthy of note: HMS Furious was a battlecruiser converted to one of the earliest aircraft carriers. Battlecruisers were the perfect choice for conversion because they were long (HMS Invincible was forty feet longer than HMS Dreadnought...the additional length giving space for more boilers and turbines for extra speed). The additional speed gave planes a better chance to take off when the ship turned into the wind.

In July 1918, seven Sopwith Camels were launched from Furious and destroyed two zeppelins stationed at Tondern. This was the first successful carrier strike in history and provides another link between the battlecruiser of the early twentieth century and the modern fleet operations we see today.
 
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