# So, Why DID the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor?



## JoanDrake (Jul 19, 2014)

As we all know (said Captain Obvious) the reason Japan attacked the US was because we had placed an oil embargo on them and they needed the oil to be found in the Dutch East Indies. Got it.

So why in HELL didn't they just go to war with the DUTCH? 

And OK, so I guess the Dutch were allied with the British, so why didn't they just go to war with the BRITISH, alone? (which they did anyway by attacking PH, as Britain was quite anxious to ally with the US)

There surely was no real assurance that the US would come into the war in defense of Britain or the Dutch, if the US had not been attacked, as both had been at war with Germany for over a year and the US had not come into that war yet.

And they surely didn't expect the US to lift the Embargo, even if they had achieved their limited objective of  making the US sue for peace.

OK, they really couldn't have expected to win anyway BUT that's not what I'm talking about here. It just seems to not make sense to bother the US even if they COULD have won.

Must be something well-known I'm overlooking.


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## BAYLOR (Jul 19, 2014)

Yamamoto knew that if Japan went to war with America their  only chance  was a knockout blow against the US fleet at Pearl .   Japan  had only 1/5 the industrial capacity of the US an if the war turned into a long struggle Japan couldn't win.


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## Karn Maeshalanadae (Jul 19, 2014)

Not only that, but the three main targets-three aircraft carriers-weren't even in port at the time of the attack. One was undergoing repairs in San Diego and the other two were out at sea. Regardless, neither the attack on Pearl Harbor nor the bombings should have ever happened. I suppose the only solace to this is, after Nagasaki, no atomic weapon has ever been used in warfare...but sometimes, the price of the lessons humanity learns is simply too high.


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## BAYLOR (Jul 19, 2014)

Karn Maeshalanadae said:


> Not only that, but the three main targets-three aircraft carriers-weren't even in port at the time of the attack. One was undergoing repairs in San Diego and the other two were out at sea. Regardless, neither the attack on Pearl Harbor nor the bombings should have ever happened. I suppose the only solace to this is, after Nagasaki, no atomic weapon has ever been used in warfare...but sometimes, the price of the lessons humanity learns is simply too high.



Japan's only real option was diplomacy. If they had for example, agreed to withdraw from Manchuria, scale back some of their territorial ambitions and repudiate the axis treaty they signed with Germany and Italy,  The US might have lifted the metal and fuel embargoes.


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## J-Sun (Jul 19, 2014)

I may be wrong (been a long time since I've read anything on WWII and I always preferred the European and African theaters anyway) but I was thinking, in the bigger scale, that Japan had an expansionist imperialist mentality with "master race" tinges and felt someone had to control the Pacific and, given the US's size and relatively recent rise in power in the region (and that the Japanese may have been feeling their oats from having bloodied Russia's nose) they figured either we or they were going to control the region and wanted it to be them. There were all kinds of trade and embargo issues over a period of time - I don't think it was any one incident but just an inevitable (given certain preconditions) collision.

But, again, I may be very off here.


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## Karn Maeshalanadae (Jul 19, 2014)

BAYLOR said:


> Japan's only real option was diplomacy. If they had for example, agreed to withdraw from Manchuria, scale back some of their territorial ambitions and repudiate the axis treaty they signed with Germany and Italy,  The US might have lifted the metal and fuel embargoes.




Very true, but it is not the route that Japan took. I'm not sure if I should say it was ultimately for the better that America got involved or not, though...initially, the U.S. did not want to get involved, but Pearl Harbor pushed us over the edge.

Honestly, I don't know if there is any telling how things would have gone if the bombs hadn't been dropped...but it wasn't the least of which that we discovered what true power they actually had, and that later on safeguards were set in place, obviously, the Geneva convention...


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## Brian G Turner (Jul 19, 2014)

So far as I understand it, it wasn't so much the ships at Pearl Harbour that were the original target, as much as the oil depots that supplied the US Pacific Fleet.

EDIT: Yep:
Attack on Pearl Harbor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



> The attack was intended as a preventive action in order to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with military actions the Empire of Japan was planning in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. There were simultaneous Japanese attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong.


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## paranoid marvin (Jul 19, 2014)

There's several things to consider.  They may have see the President as a 'dove' due to his unwillingness to go to war in Europe; so attacking and immediately looking for a favourable peace agreement may have seemed like a good idea. 

Or they may have known that the US were going to go to war against the Axis forces and thought that the US wouldn't want a war on (at least) two fronts and so sue for favourable peace terms.

Or there may have been a deal, or an agreement (written or unwritten) or even an assumption that if they declared war on the US and that Germany quickly put to an end the war in the West, that a pact with Germany would force the US to surrender, having the Germans on one side with their powerful ground forces and the Japanese on the other with their powerful navy. This could be true, as the Germans (unwisely) then declared war on the US. The results of this surrender again would be favourable to the Japanese.


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## Null_Zone (Jul 19, 2014)

War with the US was considered inevitably, and Japan was already on the borderline wrong side of a numerical inferiority with quite a few more American carriers coming online in the very near future. As it was the Japanese were geared for a very specific type of ware against America, lure the fleet out and conduct attentional battles until you can fight a decisive battle. That doesn't work too well when the numbers are massively one sided. So it's best to pick a fight on your terms.

Plus, you know, the japanese military was absolutely insane and only had a passing acquaintance with the real world.


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## BAYLOR (Jul 20, 2014)

Japan was supposed to launch a third wave attack on the oil depots, They were all set to do and then decided not to.  Taking out the depots would have caused a whole host problems for the Pacific fleet.


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## JoanDrake (Jul 20, 2014)

J-Sun said:


> I may be wrong (been a long time since I've read anything on WWII and I always preferred the European and African theaters anyway) but I was thinking, in the bigger scale, that Japan had an expansionist imperialist mentality with "master race" tinges and felt someone had to control the Pacific and, given the US's size and relatively recent rise in power in the region (and that the Japanese may have been feeling their oats from having bloodied Russia's nose) they figured either we or they were going to control the region and wanted it to be them. There were all kinds of trade and embargo issues over a period of time - I don't think it was any one incident but just an inevitable (given certain preconditions) collision.
> 
> But, again, I may be very off here.


 
I'm beginning to think that may be the best explanation. I've read one book about the 19th-20th century Pacific and it does seem the Japanese were very convinced it was "their" ocean and the US was the only real rival they had there. (Makes me wonder about the viability of an AH where the Japanese take Hawaii in the 1890's instead of the Americans. Our President at the time was against an Imperialistic America and I have to wonder if he would have gone to war with Japan if they had stepped in to "protect" native  "Asian" peoples )

Interestingly, the enemy the US was most concerned about in the area, at least in the 20's, was the British


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## paranoid marvin (Jul 20, 2014)

The most intriguing question for me is just how much did the US know or suspect about the attack?


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## Venusian Broon (Jul 23, 2014)

I think it's reasonably clear from history that the US was probably _the_ prime main power against Japanese aggression from 1937 onwards (possibly even from 1931 when Japan took Manchuria)

1937      - Japan invades China - US actively supports China with loans and arms
1938/39  - Japanese bombing of Chinese civilians and the Nanking massacre provokes world outrage - US starts with 'moral embargo' of aircraft and related material. This is stepped up over time. Although not hurting the Japanese really, it effectively blanket bans all US exports of military material to Japan. Aviation gasoline is included in this embargo, but not oil in general - Japan at this time depends on US oil, about 80% of all oil is from the US. Embargo is later extended to iron and scrap. 
1941      - Japan 'occupies' southern French Indochina meaning that the Dutch East Indies and British Empire assets are now easily within range of Japanese planes. The US leads the protests, calling for withdrawal and imposes a complete oil embargo, that the UK and the Dutch also impose.  

So in the eyes of the Japanese what's happening and who is the biggest enemy in 1941?

- The Soviet Union looks like it's on the ropes and not wanting to provoke Japan to leap in and get involved with it's life and death struggle with Nazi Germany.
- The British Empire is also looking very vulnerable and also is not wanting to prod  the Japanese to aggressive action. 
- That leaves the US, the biggest other naval power in the Pacific as the main threat (and with the above actions detailed above, the Japanese see as directly threatening their military policy and nation.)

Now for a while the Japanese Prime minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, has been trying to broker a neutrality pact with the US - which essentially meant that Japan was to curtail aggressive acts, withdraw from China etc... Apart from the fact that the Military in Japan tend to disagree with having to do this and the deal was negotiated behind everyone's back, all such discussion really go out of the window after the occupying of southern Indochina (They continue of course but then's it all about trying to mislead the US about future intentions). They've been stockpiling oil, but I believe when the embargo comes in it's something like: the army has about 6 months of fuel for fighting, and the Navy has about 2 years maximum to maintain the fleets. 



So the Japanese have a bit of a prisoners dilemma.

If they do nothing their campaign in China grinds to a halt, as does the rest of their industry and their fleet is on borrowed time. They will be forced to accede to US demands. 

Or they go to war. Ideally they would like it if the UK or US are the aggressors, but it is highly unlikely that is going to happen. So their only other option is to declare war and to grab the oil for themselves to maintain their expansionist policies (by this time Tojo is prime minister and the military are in charge)

Now they could do a more limited campaign and take the Dutch oil fields and also all far eastern British assets (well the Dutch can't defend themselves and the British are occupied in Europe and Africa, and the Japanese are part of the Axis powers...) But what sort of response does this provoke from the US, they wonder?

I think they are convinced it will lead to the US declaring war on them. In fact as they are unlikely to accede to US demands to leave China alone, they probably see war with US as inevitable. So while they are occupied taking these the Dutch and British territories, they are frightened that the US fleet and armed forces would attack, so their thinking is, "Well if it's going to happen anyway, we should try and cripple the strongest enemy first, so that we have enough time to complete our conquests." In some ways this is not outlandish that US military action was coming. Roosevelt had moved the Pacific fleet from it's original anchorage of San Diego in early 1941 to Pearl Harbour and was beefing up the US forces in the Philippines. 

Of course we don't know if the US would have declared war if Japan had only seized the Brits and Dutch territories. Being attacked at PH certainly made Roosevelt's job much easier.

Possibly also they had fantasies about Germany taking both the USSR and Britain out quickly and then Japan & Germany ganging up against the US - something that might have not looked outlandish in October 1941.

So after that essay, I'll give the one sentence reply: _They thought war with US was inevitable so they tried to gain the upper hand, while their forces were strong, with a surprise attack._ 

As for how much the US actually knew about Japanese intentions, I believe the standard thinking is that the US thought there might be an attack of some form, just not on the Pacific fleet and the US. There are of course alternative explanations that had all of the high commands and political leaders of the UK and US knowing exactly what was going to happen and allowed it to shake the US out of its isolationist leanings, but I don't know if these theories have any legs.


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## reiver33 (Mar 6, 2016)

I believe the Japanese attack was down to American diplomatic racism (please let me finish!) - they turned the economic screw too harshly, too quickly, in the belief that no Oriental power would ever dare to/be stupid enough to start a war with the US. Both sides suffered from misconceptions regarding intentions and capabilities.


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## BAYLOR (Mar 6, 2016)

reiver33 said:


> I believe the Japanese attack was down to American diplomatic racism (please let me finish!) - they turned the economic screw too harshly, too quickly, in the belief that no Oriental power would ever dare to/be stupid enough to start a war with the US. Both sides suffered from misconceptions regarding intentions and capabilities.




And what do you call what the Japanese were doing to China?


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## reiver33 (Mar 6, 2016)

I call it the brutal invasion and exploitation of a weak and divided regime. The so-called 'Greater South-East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' was simply a fig-leaf covering Japanese expansion - empire building as a form of anti-colonialism, in respect of the European powers. 

My point above is that nation states generally have a clearer view of their own capabilities than they do of potential opponents - be this in terms of military ability, economic might or political will. The Japanese believed their economic oppression at the hands of the US could only be alleviated by military action. The US believed their economic 'stick' would curtail Japanese millenarianism. Both were mistaken.


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## BAYLOR (Mar 6, 2016)

reiver33 said:


> I call it the brutal invasion and exploitation of a weak and divided regime. The so-called 'Greater South-East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' was simply a fig-leaf covering Japanese expansion - empire building as a form of anti-colonialism, in respect of the European powers.
> 
> My point above is that nation states generally have a clearer view of their own capabilities than they do of potential opponents - be this in terms of military ability, economic might or political will. The Japanese believed their economic oppression at the hands of the US could only be alleviated by military action. The US believed their economic 'stick' would curtail Japanese millenarianism. Both were mistaken.



The US didn't really have choice  on this one given what japan was doing.  And even if the US had done nothing the Japanese would have attacked us sooner or later . A showdown had to come because  in the Pacific, we were standing in their way of empire. You talk about racism , well with some exceptions the Japanese had nothing but contempt for other Asian peoples and Europeans and Americans.  They viewed the US the same easy Hitler viewed the Russians ,  as soft and weak. Yamamoto who had been educated in the US knew otherwise and warned the Japans leaders  of just how dangerous a foe the US  could be in a war situation . The Japanese High command chose to ignore his warnings to their sorrow as it turned out.


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## reiver33 (Mar 6, 2016)

I was speaking of diplomatic racism, but your point concerning Yamamoto is absolutely correct - the other members of the Japanese higher circle had a blinkered and stylized view of 'Westerners' in general and the US in particular


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## BAYLOR (Mar 7, 2016)

reiver33 said:


> I was speaking of diplomatic racism, but your point concerning Yamamoto is absolutely correct - the other members of the Japanese higher circle had a blinkered and stylized view of 'Westerners' in general and the US in particular



Yamamoto knew that if Japan couldn't achieve a quick knockout , they were doomed to defeat. Even if they had at launched the third wave at Pearl Harbor and had been victorious at Midway , they still would have lost the war.


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## Foxbat (Mar 8, 2016)

Possibly worth mentioning that there was a shift in military ideology in the thirties. From 1890 (Sino-Japanese war), through 1905 (Russo-Japanese war) to the thirties (including the renewed conflict with China) the Northerm Road military ideology (Hokushinron) was dominant. The Southern Road (Nanshinron) advocators began to make ground with the belief that Japan's destiny lay in dominating Southeast Asia (although they had little experience dealing with their southern neighbours and probably presumed similar strategies would work wherever they were employed). This shift in ambition was  what led (ultimately) to Pearl Harbour.

I think the biggest surprise about the 7th of December 1941 was that it was any surprise at all. It was a strategy employed previously in the Russo-Japanese war on the 8th of February 1904 when they attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.

The _Day of Infamy_ of 1941 contrasts with the report from the Times Of London in 1904 who said: _The Japanese Navy has opened the war by an act of daring which is destined to take a place of honour in naval annals. _Who now remembers that?


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## Ray McCarthy (Mar 8, 2016)

Foxbat said:


> when they attacked the Russian fleet


The Japanese sank most of the Russian fleet, not just in Harbour. The Russians thought Radio would give away position, but there was only two routes, and Japanese used observers with radio in 1905 war to "plot" route of Russian Attack fleet.
Early Radio reporting too, as a US journalist was allowed to accompany Japanese in Chinese Junk, radio to mainland and messages forwarded to his US Paper by mix of telegraph and radio.

This was 16 years before Broadcast radio and only about 7 years after successful start of commercialisation of Wireless by Marconi and quickly others. Marconi didn't invent Wireless, he never claimed to either, his advance was the large wire up high (hence aerial) and the other in the ground (hence earth) rather than small portable loop on the earlier sets. He and others  then added tuning which allowed multiple operators and greater efficiency.


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## Cathbad (Mar 8, 2016)

BAYLOR said:


> Yamamoto knew that if Japan couldn't achieve a quick knockout , they were doomed to defeat. Even if they had at launched the third wave at Pearl Harbor and had been victorious at Midway , they still would have lost the war.



I believe so... yet, if they weren't going to press, they should've just stayed home.


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## Foxbat (Mar 8, 2016)

Ray McCarthy said:


> The Japanese sank most of the Russian fleet, not just in Harbour. The Russians thought Radio would give away position, but there was only two routes, and Japanese used observers with radio in 1905 war to "plot" route of Russian Attack fleet.
> Early Radio reporting too, as a US journalist was allowed to accompany Japanese in Chinese Junk, radio to mainland and messages forwarded to his US Paper by mix of telegraph and radio.



Just curious. Is this one of the earliest examples of radio being used to co-ordinate naval action?


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## Ray McCarthy (Mar 8, 2016)

Foxbat said:


> Is this one of the earliest examples of radio being used to co-ordinate naval action?


I think it might. Very well done too. Also first Radio War reporting.
Earliest attempted use was Boer War (not sure which one). But the wagon mounted radio sets were stuck on ship at Durban or some such place for a while, but may have been of some assistance for Port Arthur (on land) later.

Next widespread use in war was 1914, French developed the R type valve (tube), before then it was very primitive. Used on planes for gun spotting etc, morse key strapped to thigh ... Balloons used cabled phones.

Mechanical TV (22 line as per Baird's 1930 dead end system) had been demo'd  in 1899, Fax on telegraphic lines from 1852, so in theory UK COULD have had live reporting (via morse code, fax and 22 line video) via relay stations from the Boer War.

Communications history is an interest of mine and my first job was as a BBC Communications Engineer.


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## psikeyhackr (Mar 8, 2016)

Never underestimate the stupidity of the over-inflated military ego.

Commodore Perry was American.  The barbarians must be put in their place.

psik


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## BAYLOR (Mar 9, 2016)

Cathbad said:


> I believe so... yet, if they weren't going to press, they should've just stayed home.



The United States greatest advantage was our industrial capacity in that era was enormous . We could simply outproduce Japan, Germany and Italy.


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## Foxbat (Mar 9, 2016)

psikeyhackr said:


> Never underestimate the stupidity of the over-inflated military ego.
> 
> Commodore Perry was American.  The barbarians must be put in their place.
> 
> psik


The roots of Pearl Harbour could arguably be traced right back to Perry and the _coming of the black ships._ A desire to become a world power emerged as a quick follow-on to the end of Japan's isolationism. Its feudal system was more or less dismantled by the Meiji Restoration, which put the emperor back in charge, and ended the Tokugawa Shogunate. It was at this time that the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy came into being.

The Japanese employed British experts to help where the navy was concerned (many of the Japanese ships involved in the Russo-Japanese war were built in the UK) and French to help organise the new army. After the Franco-Prussian war, the French were ditched in favour of the victorious Prussians, and this led to a state very similar to the militaristic European power that found its ascendancy under Frederick The Great. The Japanese did, however, keep to the Code Of Bushido (unswerving loyalty to the emperor, honour in death etc.). So now, we have a mix of Prussian militarism and Samurai fanaticism.

The problem of natural resources then reared its head and the Japanese looked to Korea with its coal reserves as the answer (the first step on the Northern Road). Coal was important because it was what was used to fuel the new navy. This brought them in to conflict with China. 

As the 20th century progressed, Oil replaced coal as the naval source of power and eyes began to look south for supplies (the ascendancy of the Southern Road thinking). After that, conflict with the The US Navy (the main player in the Pacific) was all but inevitable.


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## 2DaveWixon (May 5, 2016)

JoanDrake said:


> As we all know (said Captain Obvious) the reason Japan attacked the US was because we had placed an oil embargo on them and they needed the oil to be found in the Dutch East Indies. Got it.
> 
> So why in HELL didn't they just go to war with the DUTCH?
> 
> ...



My suggestion? The Japanese leadership was infected by the same bug that got to Dick Cheney and George W. Bush six or so decades later... That is, they were convinced that their soon-to-be enemy just would not fight, would cave in to a show of overwhelming force: a lack of understanding of Western psychology -- and American psychology in particular -- that makes American misunderstanding of Japanese psychology pale by comparison.

It is difficult for the kind of people who get deep into discussions like this thread to really understand that many, if not most, decisions come from emotions and dreams, not from calculations...

Dave Wixon



Dave Wixon


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## 2DaveWixon (May 5, 2016)

2DaveWixon said:


> My suggestion? The Japanese leadership was infected by the same bug that got to Dick Cheney and George W. Bush six or so decades later... That is, they were convinced that their soon-to-be enemy just would not fight, would cave in to a show of overwhelming force: a lack of understanding of Western psychology -- and American psychology in particular -- that makes American misunderstanding of Japanese psychology pale by comparison.
> 
> It is difficult for the kind of people who get deep into discussions like this thread to really understand that many, if not most, decisions come from emotions and dreams, not from calculations...
> 
> ...



Let me put it like this: the attack on Pearl Harbor, although sold to the more simplistic among the Japanese leadership as having military advantages, was in my opinion a PR campaign: bloody the noses of the American military and the American electorate, who supposedly lacked the inner strength (character, if you will) of the Japanese, would demand that the U.S. pull out of the Western Pacific and Asia. In other words, it was *shock and awe* for the 1940s. (And there might well have been some reason for the Japanese to believe that Americans would react like that, given that the U.S. had to be almost bludgeoned into entering WWI, and that a lot of American politics between WWI and WWII revolved around isolationism -- some Japanese no doubt thought that if the U.S. was reluctant to stand up to European adversaries, it would be even more so regarding East Asia...)

Dave Wixon, yet again


Dave Wixon


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