Joshua Jones
When all is said and done, all's quiet and boring.
I don't think there is much value in assessing anyone else's moral character. However, there is considerable value in assessing our own, and seeking to do so apart from our own opinions. Should we be judged by a jury of ourselves, we will always be innocent, be we Ghandi or Hitler. Yet, I am certain we would all agree there is a fundamental moral difference between the two. The question is what is the basis of this distinction, and more importantly, by what measure do we determine which one we are more like.What is the value in judging someone's moral character? Either the members of a society have morals that produce good outcomes, or they don't. Only St. Peter needs to evaluate moral character separate from actions.
The largest problem I see is that the worst excesses in history have come from the idea of good applied through the lens of a some sort faith, idea or political philosophy.
When you speak of moral codes not being flexible, though, you must be differentiating them from ethical theories. Both of the examples I gave above are ethical theories which seek to be nuanced and flexible, so you must be meaning a set of "do's" and "don'ts". And, yes, if by moral code you mean a set of actions, nuance is nearly impossible. The point I am trying to make is that only one popular ethical theory, Deontology, and its cousin Natural Law, are concerned primarily with actions. There are two major theories where actions are less fundamental than something else; more specifically, consequence in Utilitarian Ethics and intention in Virtue Ethics. Personally, I think the latter is more persuasive. No one acts in a vacuum; our actions are based on various reasons, rationalizations, and motivations. If these things are causal to moral or immoral action, then should they not be thought of as the starting place of morality?
And, I would change your last statement to say that the worst excesses in history come from differing definitions of how society ought to be ordered and the grasping of political power. Stalin, Mao, and the Crusades represent the latter, while Hitler and global terrorism are more the former. Though religion is frequently the excuse given to the masses (I include Social Darwinism and Humanism in the religious category for the sake of this discussion, although metanarrative is the more appropriate term for the set), the actual motivator of the antagonists is nearly always der wille zur macht.
And, again, we believe the throwing away of lives to achieve a political figure's fantasies of power is morally wrong. Why? That is the central question I am probing at. What makes that wrong? Is it simply a brute fact that it is wrong, or are the consequences what make it wrong, or is it that it begins with the assumption that der wille zur mucht is more valuable than the lives of others? How one answers that question is based on the ethical theory they either knowingly or unknowingly hold to. The bigger question is which is the right answer, and that has to be tested through logic, rather than opinion.