As with many things of this sort in Heinlein, this was more a matter of faith than genuine scientific observation; he had his own philosophical credo, and tended to ignore or override that which went against it, often becoming quite self-contradictory in the process.
I've heard this before, but I want to understand where you saw it Puppet Masters...with the Senator?...with Sam?...I'm a bit confused here.
I do think there would have been at least a momentary flash -- barely notable, but there -- as she has been a very independent woman quite used to dealing with such situations on her own
"Get back into the car," I said. She continued to look west along the road. "I thought I might get in a shot or two," she answered, her eyes bright. "She's safe here," the youngster assured me. "We're holding them, well down the road." I ignored him. "Listen, you bloodthirsty little hellion," I snapped, "get back in that car before I break every bone in your body!" "Yes, Sam." She turned and did so.
Do you think that pause...that bright eyed look down the road and short protest of wanting to get a shot or two in, WAS her momentary flash? That it was after Sam reinforced his statement that she did the logic jump? I'm not sure on this one, but it seems to fit both your sentiment and Mollygurl's.
3. The slugs never tried to regain Venus after the first failed attempt
Thanks for this part...I read that section wrong for some reason. Your point made me re-read, and it is much cleaner than my memory had it. I was mixing Titanian people with Venusians for some reason.
This seems to tie into some of Heinlein's other concepts -- that is, concepts he plays with concerning spirituality/immortality, etc. I'm thinking particularly of the "pink worm" in "Life-Line" here;
I turn to Heinlein's own thoughts on this, as stated in The Robert Heinlein Interview...
REGARDING THE 'PINK WORM' in LIFELINE
Schulman: Okay. We might as well proceed to question number two, then.
Heinlein: "I'd like to know more about your theory that 'no matter how individualistic you feel, you are really only part of an evolutionary organism.'"
Schulman: Did I quote you correctly on that?
Heinlein: You've placed a little emphasis in there: "really
only a part of." What I believe I said - the book is across the room and I'm not going to dig it out - was that "you
are part of an evolutionary organism" not "really
only a part of." Difference in emphasis, do you follow me?
Schulman: Yes.
Heinlein: Just as you are J. Neil Schulman and you are also part of the population of an area known as New York City. But it isn't a case of J. Neil Schulman being "really
only a part of" New York City. You
are J. Neil Schulman and you also happen to be one of that population group called by that name. Now,
there is a matter of emphasis here. You say, "Can you prove this?" Well, I can't prove that you are "really
only a part of" but I observe that you
are only a part of. No emphasis on it, we simply observe it. You have parents. You have at least the potentiality of offspring. I assume that you go along more or less at least with evolutionary theory.
Schulman: To a certain extent.
Heinlein: ...Yes. We simply observe that we are part of this continuing process.
Schulman: Now, I think what I was asking here was the more philosophical question...in other words, I can see that I have parents and come from an evolutionary chain.
Heinlein: Yes.
Schulman: But the phrase "evolutionary organism" seems to suggest that you have one being with central control or something...or at least some central
plan.
Heinlein: It doesn't...I don't mean to imply that. Evolutionists differ in their notions as to whether or not there is any central plan or whether the whole matter is automatic, or what it may be. All I really meant is that although we feel as if we were discrete individuals, if you consider it in terms of four dimensions with time as the fourth dimension, you are part of a branch...a branching deal, with an actual physical connection going back into the past and physical connection extending into the future until such time as it's chopped off. If you have no children then it's chopped off at that point. I have no children myself, however I'm not dead yet, either. I think, however, you are more interested in a later part here: "if so but we retain free will, why should we place the welfare of the whole organism above ourselves?" The question as to whether or not you place the welfare of your species - your race - above yourself is a matter for you to settle with yourself and for me to settle with me.
REGARDING 'NOUMENA' VERSUS 'PHENOMENA'
Heinlein: Let me invert these questions a bit. If you've read Stranger in a Strange Land, you've probably gathered what I think of faith. I do not regard faith as a basis on which to believe or disbelieve
anything. On the other hand, Neil, there are many things - practically all of the important questions of philosophy - that are not subject to final answers purely by reason. This has been gone into a considerable extent by philosophers in the past, and there's even a term - a technical term - for that called "noumena" as opposed to "phenomena." Phenomena are things that you can grasp through your physical senses or through measurements made with your physical senses through instruments an so forth and so on; in other words, phenomena are things that we can know about the physical universe. Noumena translates as the
unknowable things. The unknowable things: What is the purpose of the universe? Why are you here on this earth? What should a man do with his life? All of these are wide open, generalized, unlimited "whys." They are all noumena, and consequently they are not subject - by definition - these things are not subject to final answers simply by reason...(section about Lazarus playing both sides of most arguments cut out)...Now, do you happen to like chocolate malted milks?
Schulman: Uh, yes.
Heinlein: Now, do you like them better than strawberry malted milks?
Schulman: Yeah, I would say so.
Heinlein: Can you justify that by reason?
Schulman: No, I would say that it's a purely subjective judgment.
Heinlein: That's right. That is correct. It doesn't involve faith and it doesn't involve reason.
Schulman: But I'm using internal data; there is data which I am acting upon.
Heinlein: That's right. The internal data tells you that you like it better...but it doesn't tell you
why. This applies also to a great many things about the universe: it's your own internal, subjective evaluation of it, not any final answers given by reason or rationality.
REGARDING THE AFTERLIFE
Schulman: Do you have oany opinions on that question? (Whether there is an afterlife)
Heinlein: I usually do not express them in newspapers.
Schulman: Off the record?
Heinlein: I have little or no objective data. So far as
subjective data is concerned, I
incline to the notion that when we die, we don't die all over. That we do
not die all over. That there is
something that persists. But even that - because that opens up all of the questions of philosophy and religion - I avoid discussing other than in fiction. You'll find it discussed in fiction endlessly, both in this last book Stranger in a Strange Land and Beyond This Horizon and lots of others.